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Abstract
Recently, Halpern and Leung [2012] suggested representing uncertainty by a
weighted set of probability measures, and suggested a way of making decisions
based on this representation of uncertainty: maximizing weighted regret. Their
paper does not answer an apparently simpler question: what it means, according
to this representation of uncertainty, for an event E to be more likely than an
event E′. In this paper, a notion of comparative likelihood when uncertainty is
represented by a weighted set of probability measures is defined. It generalizes
the ordering defined by probability (and by lower probability) in a natural way;
a generalization of upper probability can also be defined. A complete axiomatic
characterization of this notion of regret-based likelihood is given.
1 Introduction
Recently, Samantha Leung and I [Halpern and Leung 2012] suggested representing uncer-
tainty by a weighted set of probability measures, and suggested a way of making decisions
based on this representation of uncertainty: maximizing weighted regret. However, we
did not answer an apparently simpler question: given this representation of uncertainty,
what does it mean for an event E to be more likely than an event E ′? This is what I do
in this paper. To explain the issues, I start by reviewing the Halpern-Leung approach.
∗Supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0812045, IIS-0911036, and CCF-1214844, AFOSR grant
FA9550-08-1-0438 and FA9550-09-1-0266, and ARO grant W911NF-09-1-0281. A preliminary version of
this paper appears in the Proceedings of the 12th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative
Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU), 2013.
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It has frequently been observed that there are many situations where an agent’s
uncertainty is not adequately described by a single probability measure. Specifically, a
single measure may not be adequate for representing an agent’s ignorance. For example,
there seems to be a big difference between a coin known to be fair and a coin whose bias
an agent does not know, yet if the agent were to use a single measure to represent her
uncertainty, in both of these cases it would seem that the measure that assigns heads
probability 1/2 would be used.
One approach that has been suggested for representing ignorance is to use a set P
of probability measures [Halpern 2003]. That approach has the benefit of representing
uncertainty in general, not by a single number, but by a range of numbers. This allows
us to distinguish the certainty that a coin is fair (in which case the uncertainty of heads
is represented by a single number, 1/2) from knowing only that the probability of heads
could be anywhere between, say, 1/3 and 2/3.
But this approach also has its problems. For example, consider an agent who believes
that a coin may have a slight bias. Thus, although it is unlikely to be completely fair, it
is close to fair. How should we represent this with a set of probability measures? Suppose
that the agent is quite sure that the bias is between 1/3 and 2/3. We could, of course,
take P to consist of all the measures that give heads probability between 1/3 and 2/3.
But how does the agent know that the possible biases are exactly between 1/3 and 2/3.
Does she not consider 2/3 + ǫ possible for some small ǫ? And even if she is confident
that the bias is between 1/3 and 2/3, this representation cannot take into account the
possibility that she views biases closer to 1/2 as more likely than biases further from 1/2.
There is also a second well-known concern: learning. Suppose that the agent initially
considers possible all the measures that gives heads probability between 1/3 and 2/3. She
then starts tossing the coin, and sees that, of the first 20 tosses, 12 are heads. It seems
that the agent should then consider a bias of greater than 1/2 more likely than a bias of
less than 1/2. But if we use the standard approach to updating with sets of probability
measures (see [Halpern 2003]), and condition each of the measures on the observation,
since the coin tosses are viewed as independent, the agent will continue to believe that
the probability of the next coin toss is between 1/3 and 2/3. The observation has no
impact as far as learning to predict better. The set P stays the same, no matter what
observation is made.
There is a well-known solution to these problems: using a second-order measure
on these measures to express how likely the agent considers each of them to be. (See
[Good 1980] for a discussion of this approach and further references.) For example, an
agent can express the fact that the bias of a coin is more likely to be close to 1/2 than
far from 1/2. In addition, the problem of learning can be dealt with by straightforward
conditioning. But this approach leads to other problems. Essentially, it seems that the
ambiguity that an agent might feel about the outcome of the coin toss seems to have
disappeared. For example, suppose that the agent has no idea what the bias is. The
obvious second-order probability to use is the uniform probability on possible biases.
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While we cannot talk about the probability that the coin is heads (there is a set of
probabilities, after all, not a single probability), the expected probability of heads is 1/2.
Why should an agent that has no idea of the bias of the coin know or believe that the
expected probability of heads is 1/2? Of course, if one had to use a single probability
measure to describe uncertainty, symmetry considerations dictate that it should be the
one that ascribes equal likelihood to heads and tails; similarly, if one had to put a single
second-order probability on the set of possible biases, uniform probability seems like the
most obvious choice. Moreover, if our interest is in making decisions, then maximizing the
expected utility using the expected probability again does not take the agent’s ignorance
into account. Kyburg [1988] and Pearl [1987] have even argued that there is no need for
a second-order probability on probabilities; whatever can be done with a second-order
probability can already be done with a basic probability.
Nevertheless, when it comes to decision-making, it does seem useful to use an ap-
proach that represents ambiguity, while still maintaining some of the features of having
a second-order probability on probabilities. One suggestion, made by Walley [1997], is to
put a second-order possibility measure on probability Leung and I similarly suggested
putting weights on each probability measure in P. Since we assumed that the weights are
normalized so that the supremum of the weights is 1, these weights can also be viewed as
a possibility measure. If the set P is finite, we can also normalize so as to view the weights
as being second-order probabilities. As with second-order probabilities, the weights can
vary over time, as more information is acquired. For example, we can start with a state of
complete ignorance (modeled by assuming that all probability measures have weight 1),
and update the weights after making an observation ob, we take the weight of a measure
Pr to be the relative likelihood of ob if Pr were the true measure. (See Section 2 for de-
tails.) With this approach, if there is a true underlying measure generating the data, over
time, the weight of the true measure approaches 1, while the weight of all other measures
approaches 0. Thus, this approach allows learning in a natural way. If, for example, the
actual bias of the coin was 5/8 in the example above, no matter what the initial weights,
as long as 5/8 had positive weight, then its weight would almost surely converge to 1 as
more observations were made, while the weight of all other measures would approach 0.
This, of course, is exactly what would happen if we had a second-order probability on
P.The weights can also be used to represent the fact that some probabilities in the set
P are more likely than others.
What makes this approach different from just using a second-order probability on P
lies in how decisions are made. Leung and I used regret, a standard approach to decision-
making that goes back to Niehans [1948] and Savage [1951]. If uncertainty is represented
by a set P of probability measures, then regret works as follows: for each act a and each
measure Pr ∈ P, we can compute the expected regret of a with respect to Pr; this is
the difference between the expected utility of a and the expected utility of the act that
gives the highest expected utility with respect to Pr. We can then associate with an act
a its worst-case expected regret of a, over all measures Pr ∈ P, and compare acts with
respect to their worst-case expected regret. With weights in the picture, we modify the
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procedure by multiplying the expected regret associated with measure Pr by the weight
of Pr, and compare acts according to their worst-case weighted expected regret. This
approach to making decisions is very different from that suggested by Walley [1997].
Moreover, using the weights in the way means that we cannot simply replace a set of
weighted probability measures by a single probability measure; the objections of Kyburg
[1988] and Pearl [1987] do not apply.
Leung and I [Halpern and Leung 2012] show that this approach seems to do reason-
able things in a number of examples of interest, and provide an elegant axiomatization
of decision-making. So how can we represent relative likelihood using this approach?
This is something not considered in earlier papers using sets of weighted probabilities. If
uncertainty is represented by a single probability measure, the answer is immediate: E is
more likely than E ′ exactly if the probability of E is greater than the probability of E ′.
When using sets of probability measures, various approaches have been considered in the
literature. The most common takes E to be more likely than E ′ if the lower probability
of E is greater than the lower probability of E ′, where the lower probability of E is its
worst-case probability, taken over the measures in P (see Section 3). We could also com-
pare E and E ′ with respect to their upper probabilities (the best-case probability with
respect to the measures in P). Another possibility is to take E to be more likely than
E ′ if Pr(E) ≥ Pr(E ′) for all measures Pr ∈ P; this gives a partial order on likelihood.
In this paper, I define a notion of relative likelihood when uncertainty is represented
by a weighted set of probability measures that generalizes the ordering defined by lower
probability in a natural way; I also define a generalization of upper probability. We
can then associate with an event E two numbers that are analogues of lower and upper
probability. If uncertainty is represented by a single measure, then these two numbers
coincide; in general, they do not. The interval can be thought of as representing the degree
of ambiguity in the likelihood of E. Indeed, in the special case when all the weights are
1, the numbers are essentially just the lower and upper probability (technically, they are
1 minus the lower and upper probability, respectively). Interestingly, the approach to
assigning likelihood is based on the approach to decision-making. Essentially, what I am
doing is the analogue of defining probability in terms of expected utility, rather than the
other way around. The approach can be viewed as generalizing both probability and
lower probability, while at the same time allowing a natural approach to updating.
Why we should be interested in such a representation. If all that we ever did with
probability was to use it to make decisions, then arguably this wouldn’t be of much
interest; Halpern and Leung’s work already shows how weighted sets of probabilities
can be used in decision-making. The results of this paper add nothing further to that
question. However, we often talk about the likelihood of events quite independent of
their use in decision-making (think of the use of probability in physics, to take just one
example). Thus, having an analogue of probability seems important and useful in its
own right.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the relevant material in
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[Halpern and Leung 2012] in Section 2, I define regret-based likelihood in Section 3, and
compare it to lower probability. I provide an axiomatic characterization of regret-based
likelihood in Section 4, and show how it relates to the axiomatic characterization of lower
probability. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Weighted Expected Regret: A Review
Consider the standard setup in decision theory. We have a state space S and an outcome
space O. An act is a function from S to O; it describes an outcome for each state.
Suppose that we have a utility function u on outcomes and a set P+ of weighted probability
measures. That is, P+ consists of pairs (Pr, αPr), where αPr is a weight in [0, 1] and Pr
is a probability on S. Let P = {Pr : ∃α((Pr, α) ∈ P+)}. For each Pr ∈ P there is
assumed to be exactly one α, denoted αPr, such that (Pr, α) ∈ P
+. It is further assumed
that weights have been normalized so that there is at least one measure Pr ∈ P such
that αPr = 1.
1 Finally, P+ is assumed to be weakly closed, so that if (Prn, αn) ∈ Pr
+ for
n = 1, 2, 3, . . ., (Prn, αn)→ (Pr, αPr), and αPr > 0, then (Pr, αPr) ∈ P
+. (I discuss below
why I require P+ to be just weakly closed, rather than closed.)
Where are the weights in P+ coming from? In general, they can be viewed them as
subjective, just like the probability measures. However, as observed in [Halpern and Leung 2012],
there is an important special case where the weights can be given a natural interpretation.
Suppose that, as in the case of the biased coin in the Introduction, we make observations
in a situation where the probability of making a given observation is determined by some
objective source. Then we can start by giving all probability measures a weight of 1.
Given an observation ob (e.g., sequence of coin tosses in the example in the Introduc-
tion), we can compute Pr(ob) for each measure Pr ∈ P; we can then update the weight
of Pr to be Pr(ob)/ supPr′∈P Pr
′(ob). Thus, the more likely the observation is according
to Pr, the higher the updated weight of Pr.2 (The denominator is just a normalization
to ensure that some measure has weight 1.) With this approach to updating, if there is a
true underlying measure generating the data, then as an agent makes more observations,
almost surely, the weight of the true measure approaches 1, while the weight of all other
measures approaches 0.3
1The assumption that at least one probability measure has a weight of 1 is convenient for comparison
to other approaches; see below. However, making this assumption has no impact on the results of this
paper; as long as we restrict to sets where the weight is bounded, all the results hold without change.
Note that the assumption that the weights are probabilities runs into difficulties if we have an infinite
number of measures in P ; for example, if P includes all measures on heads from 1/3 to 2/3, as discussed
in the Introduction, using a uniform probability, we would be forced to assign each individual probability
measure a weight of 0, which would not work well for our later definitions.
2The idea of putting a possibility on probabilities in P that is determined by likelihood also appears
in the work of Moral [1992], although he does not consider a general approach to dealing with sets of
weighted probability measures.
3The “almost surely” is due to the fact that, with probability approaching 0, as more and more
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I now review the definition of weighted regret, and introduce the notion of absolute
(weighted) regret. I start with regret. The regret of an act a in a state s ∈ S is the
difference between the utility of the best act at state s and the utility of a at s. Typically,
the act a is not compared to all acts, but to the acts in a setM , called a menu. Thus, the
regret of a in state s relative to menuM , denoted regM(a, s), is supa′∈M u(a
′(s))− u(a(s)).
4 There are typically some constraints put on M to ensure that supa′∈M u(a
′(s)) is
finite—this is certainly the case if M is finite, or the convex closure of a finite set of acts,
or if there is a best possible outcome in the outcome space O. The latter assumption
holds in this paper, so I assume throughout that supa′∈M u(a
′(s)) is finite.
For simplicity, I assume that the state space S is finite. Given a probability measure
Pr on S, the expected regret of an act a with respect to Pr relative to menu M is just
regMPr(a) =
∑
s∈S reg
M(a, s) Pr(s). The (expected) regret of a with respect to P and a
menu M is just the worst-case regret, that is,
regMP (a) = sup
Pr∈P
regMPr(a).
Similarly, the weighted (expected) regret of a with respect to P+ and a menu M is just
the worst-case weighted regret, that is,
wrMP+(a) = sup
Pr∈P
αPrreg
M
Pr(a).
Thus, regret is just a special case of weighted regret, where all weights are 1.
Note that, as far weighted regret goes, it does not hurt to augment a set P+ of
weighted probability measures by adding pairs of the form (Pr, 0) for Pr /∈ P. But if we
start with an unweighted set P of probability measures, the weighted set P+ = {(Pr, 1) :
Pr ∈ P}∪{(Pr, 0) : Pr /∈ P} is not closed in general, although it is weakly closed. There
may well be a sequence Prn → Pr, where Prn /∈ P for all n, but Pr ∈ P. But then
we would have have (Prn, 0) ∈ P
+ converging to (Pr, 0) /∈ P+. This is exactly why I
required only weak closedness. Note for future reference that, since P+ is assumed to
be weakly closed, if wrMP+(a) > 0, then there is some element (Pr, αPr) ∈ P
+ such that
wrMP+(a) = αPrreg
M
Pr(a).
Weighted regret induces an obvious preference order on acts: act a is at least as good
as a′ with respect to P+ and M , written a regP+,M a
′, if wrMP+(a) ≤ wr
M
P+(a
′). As usual,
I write a ≻regP+,M a
′ if a regP+,M a
′ but it is not the case that a′ regP+,M a. The standard
observations are made, it is possible that an agent will make a misleading observations, that are not
representative of the true measure. This also depends on the set of possible observations being rich
enough to allow the agent to ultimately discover the true measure generating the observations. Since
learning is not a focus of this paper, I do not make this notion of “rich enough” precise here.
4Recall that if X is a set of real numbers, supX , the supremum of X , is the smallest real numbers
that is greater than or equal to all the elements of X . If X is finite, then the sup is the same as the
max. But if X is, say, the interval (0, 1), then supX = 1. Similarly, inf X is the largest real number
that is less than or equal to all the elements in X .
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notion of regret is the special case of weighted regret where all weights are 1. I sometimes
write a regP,M a
′ to denote the unweighted case (i.e., where all the weights in P+ are 1).
In this setting, using weighted regret gives an approach that allows an agent to tran-
sition smoothly from regret to expected utility. It is well known that regret generalizes
expected utility in the sense that if P is a singleton {Pr}, then wrMP (a) ≤ wr
M
P (a
′) iff
EUPr(a) ≥ EUPr(a
′) (where EUPr(a) denotes the expected utility of act a with respect
to probability Pr).5 (In particular, this means that if P is a singleton, regret is menu
independent.) If we start with all the weights being 1, then, as observed above, the
weighted regret is just the standard notion of regret. As the agent makes observations,
if there is a measure Pr generating the uncertainty, the weights will get closer and closer
to a situation where Pr gets weight 1, with the weights of all other measures dropping
off quickly to 0, so the ordering of acts will converge to the ordering given by expected
utility with respect to Pr.
There is another approach with some similar properties, that again starts with un-
certainty being represented by a set P of (unweighted) probability measures. Define
wcP(a) = infPr∈P EUPr(a)). Thus wcP(a) is the worst-case expected utility of a, taken
over all Pr ∈ P. Then define a mmP a
′ if wcP(a) ≥ wcP(a
′). This is the maxmin expected
utility rule, quite often used in economics [Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989]. There are diffi-
culties in getting a weighted version of maxmin expected utility [Halpern and Leung 2012]
(see Section 3); however, Epstein and Schneider [2007] propose another approach that can
be combined with maxmin expected utility. They fix a parameter α ∈ (0, 1), and update
P after an observation ob by retaining only those measures Pr such that Pr(ob) ≥ α.
For any choice of α < 1, we again end up converging almost surely to a single measure,
so again this approach converges almost surely to expected utility.
I conclude this section with a discussion of menu dependence. Maxmin expected
utility is not menu dependent; the preference ordering on acts induced by regret can be,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 2.1: Take the outcome space to be {0, 1}, and the utility function to be the
identity, so that u(1) = 1 and u(0) = 0. As usual, if E ⊆ S, 1E denotes the indicator
function on E, where, for each state s ∈ S, we have 1E(s) = 1 if s ∈ E, and 1E(s) = 0
if s /∈ E. Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, E1 = {s1}, E2 = {s2}, E3 = {s2, s3}, M1 = {1E1, 1E2},
M2 = {1E1, 1E2, 1E3}, and P = {Pr1,Pr2}, where Pr1(s1) = Pr1(s3) = Pr1(s4) = 1/3,
Pr2(s2) = 1/4, and Pr2(s3) = 3/4. A straightforward calculation shows that reg
M1
Pr1
(1E1) =
0, regM1Pr1(1E2) = 1/3, reg
M1
Pr2
(1E1) = 1/4, reg
M1
Pr2
(1E2) = 0, reg
M2
Pr1
(1E1) = 1/3, reg
M2
Pr1
(1E2) =
2/3, regM2Pr2(1E1) = 1, and reg
M2
Pr2
(1E2) = 3/4. Thus, 1/4 = reg
M1
P (1E1) < reg
M1
P (1E2) =
1/3, while 1 = regM2P (1E1) > reg
M2
P (1E2) = 3/4. The preference on 1E1 and 1E2 depends
on whether we consider the menu M1 or the menu M2.
Suppose that there is an outcome o∗ ∈ O that gives the maximum utility; that is,
5This follows from the observation that, given a menu M , there is a constant cM such that, for all
acts a ∈M , wrM{Pr}(a) = cM − EUPr(a).
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u(o∗) ≥ u(o) for all o ∈ O. If o¯∗ is the constant act that gives outcomes o∗ in all states,
then o¯∗ is clearly the best act in all states. If there is such a best act, an “absolute”, menu-
independent notion of weighted expected regret can be defined by always comparing to
o¯∗. That is, define
reg(s, a) = u(o∗)− u(a(s));
regPr(a) =
∑
s∈S(u(o
∗)− u(a(s)) Pr(s) = u(o∗)− EUPr(a);
regP(a) = supPr∈P
∑
s∈S(u(o
∗)− u(a(s)) Pr(s) = u(o∗)− infPr∈P(EUPr(a);
wrP+(a) = supPr∈P αPr
∑
s∈S(u(o
∗)− u(a(s)) Pr(s) = supPr∈P αPr(u(o
∗)− EUPr(a)).
If there is a best act, then I write a P+ a
′ if wrP+(a) ≤ wrP+(a
′); similarly in the
unweighted case, I write a P a
′ if wrP(a) ≤ wrP(a
′).
Conceptually, we can think of the agent as always being aware of the best outcome
o∗, and comparing his actual utility with a to u(o∗). Equivalently, the absolute notion of
regret is equivalent to a menu-based notion with respect to a menu M that includes o¯∗
(since if the menu includes o¯∗, it is the best act in every state). As we shall see, in our
setting, we can always reduce menu-dependent regret to this absolute, menu-independent
notion, since there is in fact a best act: 1S.
3 Relative Ordering of Events Using Weighted Re-
gret
In this section, I consider how a notion of comparative likelihood can be defined using
sets of weighted probability measures.
As in Example 2.1, take the outcome space to be {0, 1}, the utility function to be the
identity, and consider indicator functions. It is easy to see that EUPr(1E) = Pr(E), so
that with this setup, we can recover probability from expected utility. Thus, if uncertainty
is represented by a single probability measure Pr and we make decisions by preferring
those acts that maximize expected utility, then we have 1E  1E′ iff Pr(E) ≥ Pr(E
′).
Consider what happens if we apply this approach to maxmin expected utility. Now we
have that 1E 
mm
P 1E′ iff infPr∈P Pr(E) ≥ infPr∈P Pr(E
′). In the literature, infPr∈P Pr(E),
denoted P∗(E), is called the lower probability of E, and is a standard approach to describ-
ing likelihood. The dual upper probability, supPr∈P Pr(E), is denoted P
∗(E). An easy
calculation shows that P∗(E) = 1− P∗(E) (where, as usual, E denotes the complement
of E). The interval [P∗(E),P
∗(E)] can be thought of as describing the uncertainty of E;
the larger the interval, the greater the ambiguity.
What happens if we apply this approach to regret? First consider unweighted regret.
If we restrict to acts of the form 1E, then the best act is clearly 1S, which is just the
constant function 1. Thus, we can (and do) use the absolute notion of regret here, and
for the remainder of this paper. We then get that 1E 
reg
P 1E′ iff supPr∈P(1 − Pr(E)) ≤
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supPr∈P(1−Pr(E
′)) iff supPr∈P Pr(E) ≤ supPr∈P Pr(E
′
); that is, P∗(E) ≤ P∗(E
′
). More-
over, easy manipulation shows that supPr∈P(1−Pr(E)) = 1− infPr∈P Pr(E) = 1−P∗(E).
It follows that 1E 
reg
P 1E′ iff (1−P∗(E)) ≤ (1−P∗(E
′)) iff P∗(E) ≥ P∗(E
′) iff 1E 
mm
P 1E′;
both regret and maxmin expected utility put the same ordering on events.
The extension to weighted regret is immediate. Let P+
reg
(E), the (weighted) regret-
based likelihood of E, be defined as supPr∈P αPr Pr(E). If P
+ is unweighted, so that all the
weights are 1, I write Preg(E) to denote supPr∈P Pr(E). Note that Preg(E) = 1−P∗(E),
so Preg(E) ≤ Preg(E
′) iff P∗(E) ≥ P∗(E
′). That is, the ordering induced by Preg is the
opposite of that induced by P∗. So, for example, Preg(∅) = 1 and Preg(S) = 0; smaller
sets have a larger regret-based likelihood.6
Regret-based likelihood provides a way of associating a number with each event, just
as probability and lower probability do. Moreover, just as lower probability gives a
lower bound on uncertainty, we can think of P+
reg
(E) as giving an upper bound on the
uncertainty. (It is an upper bound rather than a lower bound because larger regret means
less likely, just as smaller lower probability does.) The naive corresponding lower bound
is given by infPr∈P αPr Pr(E). This lower bound is not terribly interesting; if there are
probability measures Pr′ ∈ P such that αPr′ is close to 0, then this lower bound will be
close to 0, independent of the agent’s actual feeling about the likelihood of E. A more
reasonable lower bound is given by the expression P+
reg
(E) = 1−P+
reg
(E) (recall that the
analogous expression relates upper probability and lower probability). The intuition for
this choice is the following. If nature were conspiring against us, she would try to prove us
wrong by making αPr Pr(E) as large as possible—that is, make the weighted probability
of being wrong as large as possible. On the other hand, if nature were conspiring with us,
she would try to make αPr Pr(E) as large as possible, or, equivalently, make 1−αPr Pr(E)
as small as possible. Note that this is different from making αPr Pr(E) as large as possible,
unless αPr = 1 for all Pr ∈ P. An easy calculation shows that
1− P+
reg
(E) = 1− supPr∈P αPr Pr(E)
= infPr∈P(1− αPr Pr(E)).
This motivates the definition of P+
reg
.
The following lemma clarifies the relationship between these expressions, and shows
that [P+
reg
(E),P+
reg
(E)] really does give an interval of ambiguity.
Lemma 3.1: infPr∈P αPr Pr(E) ≤ 1−P
+
reg
(E) ≤ P+
reg
(E).
Proof: Clearly
inf
Pr∈P
αPr Pr(E) = inf
Pr∈P
αPr(1− Pr(E)).
6Since an act with smaller regret is viewed as better, the ordering on acts of the form 1E induced by
regret is the same as that induced by maxmin expected utility.
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Since, as observed above,
1−P+
reg
(E) = inf
Pr∈P
(1− αPr Pr(E)),
and for all Pr ∈ P, we have
1− αPr Pr(E) ≥ αPr(1− Pr(E)),
it follows that infPr∈P αPr Pr(E) ≤ 1−P
+
reg
(E).
Since, by assumption, there is a probability measure Pr′ ∈ P such that αPr′ = 1, it
follows that
1− P+
reg
(E) = 1− supPr∈P αPr Pr(E)
≤ 1− Pr′(E) = Pr′(E)
≤ supPr∈P αPr Pr(E)
≤ P+
reg
(E).
In general, equality does not hold in Lemma 3.1, as shown by the following example.
The example also illustrates how the “ambiguity interval” can decrease with weighted
regret, if the weights are updated as suggested in [Halpern and Leung 2012].
Example 3.2: Suppose that the state space consists of {h, t} (for heads and tails); let
Prβ be the measure that puts probability β on h. Let P
+
0 = {(Prβ , 1) : 1/3 ≤ β ≤ 2/3}.
That is, we initially consider all the measures that put probability between 1/3 and
2/3 on heads. We toss the coin and observe it land heads. Intuitively, we should now
consider it more likely that the probability of heads is greater than 1/2. Indeed, applying
likelihood updating, we get the set P+1 = {(Prβ , 3β/2) : 1/3 ≤ β ≤ 2/3};
7 the probability
measures that give h higher probability get higher weight. In particular, the weight of
Pr2/3 is still 1, but the weight of Pr1/3 is only 1/2. If the coin is tossed again and this
time tails is observed, we update further to get P+2 = {(Prβ , 4β(1−β)) : 1/3 ≤ β ≤ 2/3}.
An easy calculation shows that [P+0,reg(h),P
+
0,reg(h)] = [1/3, 2/3], [P
+
1,regret(h),P
+
1,reg(h)] =
[1/3, 3/8], and [P+2,reg(h),P
+
2,reg(h)] = [11/27, 16/27].
It is also easy to see that infPr 4β(1−β) Prβ(t) = 8/27, so infPr∈P2 4β(1−β) Prβ(t) <
1 − P+2,reg(t) < P
+
2,reg(h). Thus, for P
+
2 , we get strict inequalities for the expressions in
Lemma 3.1.
The width of the interval [P+
reg
(E),P+
reg
(E)] can be viewed as a measure of the am-
biguity the agent feels about E, just as the interval [P∗(E),P
∗(E)]. Indeed, if all the
weights are 1, the two intervals have the same width, since P∗(E) = 1 − P
+
reg
(E) and
P∗(E) = 1− P+
reg
(E) in this case.
7The weight of Prβ is the likelihood of observing heads according to Prβ , which is just β, normalized
by the likelihood of observing heads according to the measure that gives heads the highest probability,
namely 2/3.
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However, weighted regret has a significant advantage over upper and lower probability
here. If the true bias of the coin is, say 5/8, then if the set P+k represents the uncertainty
after k steps, as k increases, almost surely, [P+k,reg(h),P
+
k,reg(h)] will be a smaller and
smaller interval containing 1−5/8 = 3/8. More generally, using likelihood updated com-
bined with weighted regret provides a natural way to model the reduction of ambiguity
via learning.
One concern with the use of regret has been the dependence of regret on the menu. It
is also worth noting that, in this context, there is a sense in which we can work with the
absolute notion of weighted regret without loss of generality: if we restrict to indicator
functions, then a preference relative to a menu can always be reduced to an absolute
preference. Given a menu M consisting of indicator functions, let EM = ∪{E : 1E ∈M}.
that is, EM is the union of the events for which the corresponding indicator function is
in M .
Proposition 3.3: If M is a menu consisting of indicator functions, and 1E1, 1E2 ∈ M ,
then 1E1 
reg
P+,M 1E2 iff 1E1 + 1EM 
reg
P+ 1E2 + 1EM .
Proof: Let M ′ be any menu consisting of indicator functions that includes 1E1 + 1EM ,
1E2+1EM , and 1S. Recall that 1E1 +1EM 
reg
P+ 1E2+1EM iff 1E1+1EM 
reg
M ′,P+ 1E2+1EM ;
the absolute notion of regret is equivalent to the menu-based notion, as long as the menu
includes the best act, which in this case is 1S. It clearly suffices to show that, for all
states s ∈ S and all acts 1E ∈M ,
regM(1E, s) = reg
M ′(1E + 1EM , s).
This is straightforward. There are two cases, depending on whether s ∈ EM .
If s ∈ EM , then, by definition, there is some act 1E′ ∈ M such that s ∈ E
′, so
supa∈M u(a(s)) = u(1). Clearly supa∈M ′ u(a(s)) = u(1), since 1S ∈ M
′. Moreover,
1EM (s) = 0, so (1E + 1EM )(s) = 1E(s). Thus, for s ∈ EM ,
regM(1E, s) = supa∈M u(a(s))− u(1E(s))
= supa∈M ′ u(a(s))− u((1E + 1EM )(s))
= regM
′
(1E + 1EM , s).
For s /∈ EM , we have a(s) = 0 for all a ∈ M and 1E(s) = 0, so supa∈M u(a(s)) −
u(1E(s)) = 0. On the other hand, supa∈M ′ u(a(s)) = u(1), and u((1E + 1EM )(s)) = u(1),
so again supa∈M ′ u(a(s)) − u((1E + 1EM )(s)) = 0. Thus, we again have reg
M(1E , s) =
regM
′
(1E + 1EM , s).
4 Characterizing Weighted Regret-Based Likelihood
The goal of this section is to characterize weighted regret-based likelihood axiomatically.
In order to do so, it is helpful to review the characterizations of probability and lower
probability.
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A probability measure on a finite set S maps subsets of S to [0, 1] in a way that
satisfies the following three properties:8
Pr1. Pr(S) = 1.
Pr2. Pr(∅) = 0.9
Pr3. Pr(E ∪ E ′) = Pr(E) + Pr(E ′) if E ∩ E ′ = ∅.
These three properties characterize probability in the sense that any function f : 2S →
[0, 1] that satisfies these properties is a probability measure.
Lower probabilities satisfy analogues of these properties:
LP1. P∗(S) = 1.
LP2. P∗(∅) = 0.
LP3′. P∗(E ∪ E
′) ≥ P∗(E) + P∗(E
′) if E ∩ E ′ = ∅.
However, these properties do not characterize lower probability. There are functions that
satisfy LP1, LP2, and LP3′ that are not the lower probability corresponding to some set
of probability measures. (See [Halpern and Pucella 2002, Proposition 2.2] for an example
showing that analogous properties do not characterize P∗; the same example also shows
that they do not characterize P∗.)
Various characterizations of P∗ (and P
∗) have been proposed in the literature [Anger and Lembcke 1985;
Giles 1982; Huber 1976; Huber 1981; Lorentz 1952; Williams 1976; Wolf 1977], all sim-
ilar in spirit. I discuss one due to Anger and Lembcke [1985] here, since it makes the
contrast between lower probability and regret particularly clear. The characterization is
based on the notion of set cover: a set E is said to be covered n times by a multiset M
if every element of E appears at least n times in M . It is important to note here that
M is a multiset, not a set; its elements are not necessarily distinct. (Of course, a set
is a special case of a multiset.) Let ⊔ denote multiset union; thus, if M1 and M2 are
multisets, then M1 ⊔M2 consists of all the elements in M1 or M2, which appear with
multiplicity that is the sum of the multiplicities in M1 and M2. For example, using the
{{. . .}} notation to denote a multiset, then {{1, 1, 2}} ⊔ {{1, 2, 3}} = {{1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3}}.
If E ⊆ S, then an (n, k)-cover of (E, S) is a multiset M that covers S k times and
covers E n + k times. Multiset M is an n-cover of E if M covers E n times. For
example, if S = {1, 2, 3}, then {{1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3}} is a (2, 1)-cover of ({1}, S), a (1, 1)-cover
of ({1, 2}, S), and a 3-cover of {1}. Consider the following property:
LP3. For all integers m,n, k and all subsets E1, . . . , Em of S, if E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Em is an
(n, k)-cover of (E, S), then k + nP∗(E) ≥
∑m
i=1P∗(Ei).
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8Since I assume that S is finite here, I assume that all probability measures have domain 2S , and
ignore measurability issues.
9This property actually follows from the other two, using the observation that Pr(S ∪ ∅) = Pr(S) +
Pr(∅); I include it here to ease the comparison to other approaches.
10Note that LP3 implies LP2, using the fact that ∅ ⊔ ∅ is a (1,0)-cover of (∅, S).
12
There is an analogous property for upper probability, where ≥ is replaced by ≤. It is
easy to see that LP3 implies LP3′ (since E ⊔ E ′ is a (1, 0) cover of E ∪ F ).
Theorem 4.1: [Anger and Lembcke 1985] If f : 2S → [0, 1], then there exists a set P of
probability measures with f = P∗ if and only if f satisfies LP1, LP2, and LP3.
Moving to regret-based likelihood, clearly we have
REG1. P+
reg
(S) = 0.
REG2. P+
reg
(∅) = 1.
The whole space S has the least regret; the empty set has the greatest regret. In the
unweighted case, since Preg(E) = P
∗(E), REG1, REG2, and the following analogue of
LP3 (appropriately modified for P∗) clearly characterize Preg :
REG3′. For all integers m,n, k and all subsets E1, . . . , Em of S, if E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Em is an
(n, k)-cover of (E, S), then k + nPreg(E) ≤
∑m
i=1Preg(Ei).
Note that complements of sets (E1, . . . , Em, E) are used here, since regret is minimized if
the probability of the complement is maximized. This need to work with the complement
makes the statement of the properties (and the proofs of the theorems) slightly less
elegant, but seems necessary.
It is not hard to see that REG3′ does not hold for weighted regret-based likelihood.
For example, suppose that S = {a, b, c} and P+ = ((Pr1, 2/3), (Pr2, 2/3), (Pr3, 1)), where,
identifying the probability Pr with the tuple (Pr(a),Pr(b),Pr(c)), we have
• Pr1 = (2/3, 0, 1/3);
• Pr2 = (1/3, 0, 2/3);
• Pr3 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Then P+
reg
({a, b}) = P+
reg
({b, c}) = 4/9, while P+
reg
({b}) = 2/3. Since {a, b} ⊔ {b, c} is a
(1,1)-cover of ({b}, {a, b, c}), REG3′ would require that
P+
reg
({a, b}) + P+
reg
({b, c}) ≥ 1 + P+
reg
({b}),
which is clearly not the case.
We must thus weaken REG3′ to capture weighted regret-based likelihood. It turns
out that the appropriate weakening is the following:
REG3. For all integers m,n and all subsets E1, . . . , Em of S, if E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Em is an
n-cover of E, then nP+
reg
(E) ≤
∑m
i=1P
+
reg
(Ei).
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Although REG3 is weaker than REG3′, it still has some nontrivial consequences. For
example, it follows from REG3 that P+
reg
is anti-monotonic. If E ⊆ E ′, then E is a
1-cover of E
′
, so by REG3, we must have P+
reg
(E) ≥ P+
reg
(E ′). Since E ⊔ E ′ is trivially
a 1-cover of E ∪ E ′, it also follows that P+
reg
(E) + P+
reg
(E
′
) ≥ P+
reg
(E ∪ E ′). REG3 also
implies REG1, since ∅ (= S) is an n-cover of itself for all n.
I can now state the representation theorem. It says that a representation of uncer-
tainty satisfies REG1, REG2, and REG3 iff it is the weighted regret-based likelihood
determined by some set P+. The set P+ is not unique, but it can be taken to be max-
imal, in the sense that if weighted regret-based likelihood with respect to some other
set (P ′)+ gives the same representation, then for all pairs (Pr, α′) ∈ (P ′)+, there exists
α ≥ α′ such that (Pr, α) ∈ P+. This (unique) maximal set P+ can be viewed as the
canonical representation of uncertainty.
Theorem 4.2: If f : 2S → [0, 1], then there exists a weakly closed set P+ of weighted
probability measures with f = P+
reg
if and only if f satisfies REG1, REG2, and REG3;
moreover, P+ can be taken to be maximal.
Proof: Clearly, given a weakly closed set P+ of weighted probability measures, the
function P+
reg
satisfies REG1 and REG2. To see that it satisfies REG3, suppose that
E1⊔ . . .⊔Em is an n-cover of E. If P
+
reg
(E) = 0, then REG3 trivially holds. If P+
reg
(E) >
0, then since P+ is weakly closed, there must be some probability Pr ∈ P such that
P+
reg
(E) = αPr Pr(E). Since E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Em is an n-cover of E, it is easy to see that
Pr(E1) + · · ·+ Pr(Em) = nPr(E), so αPr Pr(E1) + · · ·+ αPr Pr(Em) = nαPr Pr(E). But
αPr Pr(E) = P
+
reg
(E), by construction, and αPr Pr(Ei) ≤ P
+
reg
(Ei), i = 1, . . . , n. Thus,
nP+
reg
(E) ≤
∑m
i=1P
+
reg
(Ei).
For the opposite direction, suppose that f : 2S → [0, 1] satisfies REG1, REG2, and
REG3. Let P = ∆(S), the set of all probability measures on S, and for Pr ∈ P, define
αPr = sup{β : β Pr(E) ≤ f(E) for all E ⊆ S}.
Note that, for all Pr ∈ P, we have 0 Pr(E) ≤ f(E) for all E ⊆ S, since f(E) ∈ [0, 1], and
1Pr(∅) = f(∅) = 1. It follows that αPr ∈ [0, 1] for all Pr ∈ P. Let P
+ = {(Pr, αPr) : Pr ∈
∆(S)}. It is easy to see that P+ is weakly closed. We want to show that there exists
Pr ∈ ∆(S) such that (1) αPr = 1 (since this is one of the conditions on sets of weighted
measures) and (2) f(E) = P+
reg
(E) for all E ⊆ S.
The proof of this result makes critical use of the following variant of Farkas’ Lemma
[Farkas 1902] (see [Schrijver 1986, page 89]) from linear programming, where A is a ma-
trix, b is a column vector, and x is a column vector of distinct variables:
Lemma 4.3: If Ax ≥ b is unsatisfiable, then there exists a row vector β such that
1. β ≥ 0
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2. βA = 0
3. βb > 0.
Intuitively, β is a “witness” of the fact that Ax ≥ b is unsatisfiable. This is because
if there were a vector x satisfying Ax ≥ b, then 0 = (βA)x = β(Ax) ≥ βb > 0, a
contradiction.
To prove the first claim, suppose that S = {s1, . . . , sN}. I now construct a set of linear
equations in the variables x1, . . . , xN such that a solution to the equations guarantees the
existence of a probability measure Pr ∈ ∆(S) such that αPr = 1. Intuitively, we want xi
to be Pr(xi). Since we must have Pr(E) ≤ f(E) for all E ⊂ S,
11 for each E ⊂ S, we
have the inequality
∑
{i:si /∈E} xi ≤ f(E). Note that since f(∅) = 1, the equation when
E = ∅ is x1+ · · ·+xN ≤ 1. In addition, we require that xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , and that
x1+ · · ·+xN = 1. It suffices to require that x1+ · · ·+xn ≥ 1, since, as I observed earlier,
the equation corresponding to E = ∅ already says x1 + · · ·+ xn ≤ 1. To apply Farkas’
Lemma all the inequalities need to involve ≥, so this collection of inequalities must be
rewritten as:
−
∑
{i:si /∈E} xi ≥ −f(E), for all E ⊂ S
xi ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . , N
x1 + · · ·+ xN ≥ 1.
This system of inequalities can be expressed in the form Ax ≥ b. Note that A is a
matrix all of whose entries are either −1, 0, or 1, and, in the first 2N − 1 rows (the lines
corresponding to equations for each E ⊂ S), all the entries are either 0 or −1, while in
the final N + 1 rows, all the entries are either 0 or 1.
A solution of this system of inequalities provides the desired Pr. But if this systems
has no solution, then by Farkas’ Lemma, there exists a nonnegative vector β such that
βA = 0 and βb > 0. Since all the entries of A are either −1, 0, or 1, it follows from
standard observations (cf. [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990, Lemma 2.7]) we can take
β to a vector of all whose entries are rational. 12 Since we can multiply each term in β
by the product of the denominators of the entries of β, we can assume without loss of
generality that the entries of β are natural numbers.
Since A has 2N+N rows, β is a vector of the form (β1, . . . , β2N+N). Let A1, . . . , A2N+N
be the rows of A; each of these is a vector of length N . Since βA = 0, that means that
β1A1+ · · ·+ β2N+NA2N+N = 0. Suppose for now that β2N , . . . , β2N+N−1 (the coefficients
for the rows corresponding to the inequalities xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , N) are all 0; as I show
below, this assumption can be made without loss of generality.
11I use ⊂ to denote strict subset.
12There is a slight subtlety here since β also has to satisfy βb > 0, and b may involve irrational numbers
(since f(E) may be irrational for some sets E). However, if there is a nonnegative β that satisfies βA = 0
and βb > 0, then there is a nonnegative β that satisfies βA = 0 and βb′ > 0, where b′ consists only of
rational entries and b′ ≤ b. Thus, there is a vector β with rational entries such that βA = 0 and βb′ > 0,
so βb > 0.
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With this assumption, we can rewrite the equations as β1A1 + . . . β2N−1A2N−1 =
−β2N+NA2N+N . If E1, . . . , E2N−1 are the subsets of S that correspond to the equations
for A1, . . . , A2N−1, respectively, this equation says that β1 copies of E1, β2 copies of E2,
. . . , and β2N−1 copies of E2N−1 form a β2N+N -cover of S. (Recall that A2N+N is a row of
all−1’s, so −A2N+N corresponds to S.) Thus, by REG3, β1f(E1)+· · ·+β2N−1f(E2N−1) ≥
β2N+Nf(∅) = β2N+N . But Farkas’ Lemma requires that βb > 0, where, by construction,
bi = −f(Ei) for i = 1, . . . , 2
N − 1, bi = 0 for i = 2
N , . . . , 2N + N − 1, and b2N+N = 1.
Thus, we must have −(β1f(E1) + · · · + β2N−1f(E2N−1)) > −β2N+N . Clearly, this gives
a contradiction. Thus, we can conclude, as desired, that the equations are solvable, and
that there exists a probability measure Pr such that αPr = 1.
It remains to show that we can assume without loss of generality that β2
N
, . . . ,
β2
N+N−1 are all 0. Note that since β ≥ 0, they must all be nonnegative. I prove by
induction on β2N + · · ·+ β2N+N−1 that if there is a vector β ≥ 0 such that βA = 0 and
βb > 0, then there is such a vector with β2N + · · ·+ β2N+N−1 = 0.
So suppose that there is a solution β with β2N + · · ·+β2N+N−1 > 0. Suppose without
loss of generality that β2N > 0. Recall that A2N corresponds to the inequality x1 ≥ 0.
Choose j ∈ {0, . . . , 2N − 1} such that βj > 0 and s1 /∈ Ej . There must be such a j, for
otherwise we would not have βA = 0. Let j′ be such that Ej′ = Ej ∪ {s1}. Define a
vector β ′ such that β ′
2N
= β2N −1, β
′
j = βj −1, β
′
j′ = βj +1, and β
′
i = βi if i /∈ {j, j
′, 2N}.
It is easy to check that β ′A = 0 and that β ′
2N
+ · · ·+ β ′
2N+N−1 < β2N + · · ·+ β2N+N−1.
It remains to show that β ′b > 0. Since Ej ⊂ Ej′ , we must have f(Ej) ≥ f(Ej′), so
β ′b = βb+ f(Ej)− f(Ej′) ≥ βb > 0. This completes the inductive step of the argument.
Now we must show the second required property holds, namely, that f(E) = P+
reg
(E)
for all E ⊆ S. By construction, αPr Pr(E) ≤ f(E) for all E ⊆ S, so it suffices to show
that there is some Pr ∈ P such that αPr Pr(E) = f(E). For this, it suffices to show
that there exists a measure Pr such that Pr(E) = 1, and for each E ′ ⊂ S, we have
f(E) Pr(E ′) ≤ f(E ′), since then αPr = f(E), so αPr Pr(E) = f(E), as desired.
To show that such a measure exists, we again construct a set of linear inequalities
much as above, and apply Farkas’ Lemma. Using the same notation as above, suppose
for simplicity that E = {s1, . . . , sM}, where M ≤ N . Now the required inequalities just
involve the variables x1, . . . , xM :
−
∑
{i:si∈E∩E
′
}
xi ≥ −f(E
′)/f(E), for all E ′ ⊂ S such that E ∩ E
′
6= ∅
xi ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . ,M
x1 + · · ·+ xM ≥ 1.
Again, the requirement that x1 + · · ·+ xM ≤ 1 follows from the equation for E.
If this system of inequalities is satisfiable, then we have the required probability
measure, so suppose that it is not satisfiable. Again, writing this system of equations as
Ax ≥ b, by Farkas’ Lemma, there exists a nonnegative vector β such that βA = 0 and
βb > 0. We now proceed much as before. Again, we can assume that β is a vector of
natural numbers. If we assume for now that β2
M
, . . . , β2
M+M−1 (the coefficients for the
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rows corresponding to the inequalities xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , N) are all 0, then the fact
that βA = 0 means that we have β2M+M cover of E. We get a contradiction to REG3 in
an almost identical way to above. This completes the argument.
5 Conclusion
I have defined an approach for associating with an event E a numerical representation of
its likelihood when uncertainty is represented by a weighted set of probability measures.
The representation consists of a pair of a numbers, which can be thought of as upper and
lower bounds on the uncertainty. The difference between these numbers can be viewed
as a measure of ambiguity. The two numbers coincide when uncertainty is represented
by a single probability. Moreover, if each probability measure gets weight 1, then the
two numbers are essentially be viewed as the lower and upper probabilities of E. Thus,
the approach can be viewed as a generalization of lower and upper probability to the
case of weighted probability measures. The definitions show that there is a interesting
connection between regret-based approaches and minimization/maximization approaches
when it comes to defining likelihood; this connection breaks down when it comes to more
general utility calculations [Halpern and Leung 2012].
The main technical result of the paper is a complete characterization of the likelihood
in the case where the state space is finite. The notion of likelihood can easily be extended
to the case of an infinite state space (of course, an integral has to be used instead of a
sum to calculate expected utility). I believe that the characterization theorem will still
hold with essentially no change, although I have not checked details carefully.
Of course, it would be useful to get a better understanding of this numerical repre-
sentation, to see if it really captures an agent’s feelings about both the ambiguity and
the risk associated with an event, and to understand its technical properties. I leave this
to future work.
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